Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring The Future of the
Confrontation Clause in Light of its Past

2005

Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the
Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause
Peter Tillers

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Peter Tillers, Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71
Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol71/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 5

Legal History for a Dummy
A COMMENT ON THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Peter Tillers †
I struggled quite a bit over what I should talk about
today. I know a little bit about exploratory fact investigation 1
and about related matters such as induction and what
philosophers of science call the logic of discovery. 2 I thought
about discussing the worrisome implications of Crawford v.
Washington 3 for constitutional regulation of early phases of
criminal investigation, 4 and I considered talking about the
possibility that Crawford might further weaken the already
†

Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
See, e.g., Peter Tillers & David Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact
Investigation, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (1991).
2
Today the notion of a logic of discovery is much discussed. Karl Popper,
perhaps inadvertently, deserves credit for first popularizing this notion. See KARL
POPPER, LOGIK DER FORSCHUNG (1934) (the word “Forschung” is best translated as
“research” or “investigation,” but the first English translation of Popper’s book
rendered the title “The Logic of Scientific Discovery.” See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (Basic Books, 1959)).
3
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4
Truth-oriented federal constitutional constraints on preliminary phases of
criminal investigation are already de minimis. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479 (1984) (no due process violation because government failure to preserve
breath samples in a drunk driving case was not done in bad faith). It is possible – if
not inevitable – that the skepticism voiced by the Court in Crawford about the
possibility of appellate assessment of the trustworthiness of testimonial evidence
augurs continuing or even heightened reluctance by the Court to require the judiciary
to police the trustworthiness of police investigation in the name of due process. Of
course, Crawford does cast a backward shadow – it does influence pretrial police
investigation – but the size of that shadow may be rather small because relatively few
types of pretrial statements may turn out to be “testimonial” for the purposes of a
Crawfordized, or Friedmanized, Confrontation Clause.
(By speaking of
Friedmanization, I am referring to Professor Richard Friedman’s substantial role in
persuading the Supreme Court to revamp its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.) In
any event, under any interpretation of Crawford – whether narrow or broad – the
Confrontation Clause has no application to tangible evidence that does not contain
symbols deposited by human beings that are designed to communicate information – to
evidence such as blood, fingerprints, glass fragments, tire tracks, footprints, and
images recorded by automatic cameras.
1
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faint prospect that the Court might use the general due process
guarantee to scrub criminal investigation of some pathologies
that John Langbein complains about, 5 as well as other
pathologies that do not seem to worry him nearly as much. 6
But as alluring as this topic is, it has nothing to do with the
topic under discussion in this symposium. So I have decided to
stick to the assigned topic—the role of history in the
interpretation and elaboration of the Confrontation Clause.
But my decision not to go off on a tangent dooms me to
play the role of a Harold Carswell; I have to be a kind of
academic version of Harold Carswell. Carswell, you may recall,
was one of Richard Nixon’s nominees to the Supreme Court.
You will also recall that Senator Roman Hruska spoke out in
defense of that unsuccessful nomination and nominee. Hruska,
a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Creighton University, said:
Even if [Carswell] was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges
and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation,
aren’t they, and a little chance? We can’t have all Brandeises and
Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that there. 7

This, alas, is the role I have to play – the role of a
Harold G. Carswell – because I know practically nothing about
legal history, and the little I once knew I have forgotten.
But what’s the point of having an ignoramus involved in
this symposium? Being an ignoramus, I struggled over this
question. After due deliberation, I concluded that even an
ignoramus can contribute to an understanding of the role of
history in constitutional argument about the Confrontation
Clause. How can that be?
You might think of me as a cheap stand-in for Justice
Scalia. 8 I know what some of you are thinking. You’re
thinking, “I know Justice Scalia. In any event, I know

5
John Langbein worries most about the degradation of evidence by partisan
lawyers in an adversary system such as ours. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); see also JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 331-34 (2003).
6
John Langbein does not worry nearly as much about unimaginative
investigation. But imagination is essential to effective investigation. See Tillers &
Schum, supra note 1, at 934; see also Peter Tillers, The Fabrication of Facts in
Investigation and Adjudication (1998), http://tillers.net/fabrication.html.
7
Warren Weaver, Jr., Carswell Attacked and Defended as Senate Opens
Debate on Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1970, at 21. But see Bret Stephens, In
Praise of Mediocrity, JERUSALEM POST, July 16, 2002, at 16B (“Hruska was on to
something.”).
8
Justice Scalia was the author of the Court’s opinion in Crawford.
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something about you, Tillers, and I know this much: Tillers,
you’re no Scalia!”
I confess that I’m no Justice Scalia. In particular, I
confess that I can’t begin to match Scalia’s historical learning.
But this fact just proves my point because even Justice Scalia’s
formidable historical learning wasn’t good enough!
The papers presented by Professors Kirst 9 and Davies 10
for this conference make a convincing case that Justice Scalia
got some important parts of his legal history wrong and that
some of Scalia’s mistakes were elementary from a historian’s
point of view. 11 Although Professors Kirst and Davies agree
that history was misused in Crawford, the precise moral each
draws from this differs. 12 Professor Kirst’s paper suggests that
the remedy for the Court’s misuse of history is for the Court to
avail itself of better historical scholarship – scholarship that
gives a truer (and broader) picture of the original purpose, or
intended meaning, of the Confrontation Clause. Professor
Davies, by contrast, hints that the appropriate remedy for the
Court’s abuse of history is for the Court to (largely) abandon
the use of history (at least for the interpretation of some
constitutional rules or principles).

9
Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (2005).
10
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
11
Professor Davies argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, did
somewhat better than Justice Scalia, but that Rehnquist’s historical scholarship also
suffered from grievous flaws. See Davies, supra note 10, at 113-14.
12
Professors Kirst and Davies point to different errors in Justice Scalia’s
legal history and they draw different lessons from the distinct errors that they identify.
Professor Davies identifies errors more pertinent to the purposes of my little peroration
because, although Professor Kirst’s paper makes a very plausible case that the
Framers saw the Confrontation Clause as a broad – or “political” – ideal, it is
practically incontestable that Justice Scalia did commit the historical errors that
Professor Davies identifies and it is hard to avoid Davies’ conclusion that a competent
legal historian would not have committed the errors that Justice Scalia committed.
My comment does not address the question of whether an accurate
rendition of the historical record or whether reliance on a different swath of human
history would support the result that the Court reached in Crawford. My comment
addresses only the question of the extent to which the Court should rely on its
understanding of centuries-old legal precedents and practices to fashion and interpret
constitutional guarantees in the twenty-first century. For this purpose it is pertinent
that the historical account that Justice Scalia constructed was demonstrably incorrect.
Although I think Justice Scalia got his legal history wrong, it does not
necessarily follow that I think that Crawford is an unwelcome decision. This comment
does not address the more general question of whether Crawford is a good thing. (My
answer would be a qualified one; I would say that the answer depends on how
Crawford is read and on its implications. See supra note 4.)
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Professor Kirst’s argument suggests that the
appropriate remedy for the Court’s shabby historical
scholarship is better historical scholarship for and on the Court.
I suspect that this remedy will not work. The reason for my
skepticism is that I think there is an important sense in which
cutting-edge historical scholarship was available to the Court.
If the Court’s reliance on history was something more than
mere adhockery and more than a makeweight, the historical
distortions and mistakes found in Crawford (and in similar
decisions) occurred not only because the Court didn’t know how
to do legal history, but also because the Court didn’t know how
to use legal history. Crudely put, the problem is that the Court
couldn’t have recognized good legal history even if it had fallen
over it.
It’s time for ignoramus Tillers to make a reappearance.
If the Scalias of the judicial world can’t get their legal history
straight, it’s practically certain that the Harold Carswells and
Peter Tillerses of the world can’t do so either. Ignoramuses
(“ignorami”?) like me don’t know how to do good legal history.
Furthermore, ignoramuses can’t tell the difference between
good legal history and bad legal history; consequently, they
don’t know how to sniff out the good historical stuff.
I don’t mean to suggest that the current Justices of the
Supreme Court are as ignorant of legal history as I am. In this
respect they are surely at least a step or two above the
Carswells and the Tillerses of the world. I doubt, however,
that any of them are much better at their legal history than
Scalia and Rehnquist. Indeed, I suspect that in this respect
some of them are at least a notch or two below Scalia and
Rehnquist. If I am right about that, I have to agree with
Professor Davies: It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
ever get its legal history straight.
The problem here resembles a problem that arises
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 13 a decision
that requires federal trial judges to serve as “gatekeepers” and
use their own wits to allow good science into federal courtrooms
and to keep junk science out: How can you get amateurs to
make sound professional judgments? If you can’t do that, how
do you get amateurs to make sound judgments about the
credentials and conclusions of professionals?

13

509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
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There is no easy answer to this puzzle. The history of
judicial use of history suggests it is not easy to turn sow’s ears
into silk purses.

